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I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, perpetrated by Is-
lamic extremists from foreign lands, have branded American
consciousness perhaps even more deeply than any other strike
against the nation in the modern era.' The first major attack
on the mainland United States in nearly 200 years, 2 September
1 The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor may have been a greater
blow to our security, but that attack did not occur on the mainland and did not
involve the loss of as many civilians as did the September 11 attacks.
2 The last such attack occurred during the War of 1812, when the British,
among other things, attacked Washington D.C. and burned the Capitol and the
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11 has been burned into body politic and represents a visible
threat to our security and to our way of life. Americans natu-
rally have demanded immediate measures to apprehend those
responsible and to insure that similar attacks may not happen
again.
Governmental officials responded frenetically to September
11. Among other things, federal authorities immediately ques-
tioned and detained hundreds of immigrants from Islamic coun-
tries,3 and Congress rushed to pass the Patriot Act 4 in such a
short time that not only did our representatives little debate the
bill, but few had time to read the "complex, far reaching anti-
terrorism [and anti-immigrant] legislation" in its entirety.5 Fol-
lowing the aftermath of September 11, policies and practices
against the foreign born have continued. Aside from President
Bush's authorizing military tribunals to try only foreigners, not
American citizens;6 both the state and federal governments,
often with the help of private citizens, 7 have engaged in unprec-
White House. See War of 1812, 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS ENCYCLOPEDIA 143 (1986).
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing pales in comparison.
3 See Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
4 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2002).
5 Robin Toner & Neil L. Lewis, A NATION CHALLENGED: House Passes
Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, But With 5-Year Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2001, at B6. The Patriot Act contains several provisions that may in application, if
not on their face, be unfair to immigrants. Section 411, for example, makes an
immigrant deportable for contributing "material support" to an organization desig-
nated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization. The Act does not re-
quire that the immigrant know the organization has been so designated or that the
support provided will contribute to a terrorist operation. See New Antiterrorism
Legislation Summarized, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1703, 1704 (Nov. 5, 2001).
Section 412 permits the Attorney General to detain any alien he certifies that he
"reasonably believes to be a terrorist or to have engaged in any other activity that
endangers the national security of the United States." Id.
6 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001). The United States
also initially targeted only visitors from predominately Arab and Muslim coun-
tries, requiring them to be fingerprinted, photographed, and subjected to interro-
gation under oath. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the role that racial
profiling by American citizens has played in detaining Arab and Muslim looking
immigrants). Since September 11, Arabs and Muslims living in the United States
have reported increased incidence of discrimination in housing and employment.
See Muzaffar A. Chishti, Doris Meissner, et al., America's Challenge: Domestic Se-
2004]
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edented racial profiling of innocent South Asians, Arabs and
Muslims living in this country.8
Times of emergency may justify certain restrictions on lib-
erties, but the nature of the terrorist challenge calls for a much
more measured and nuanced response. Al Qaeda is said to have
cells operating in as many as sixty countries.9 Furthermore, Al
Qaeda is best described as a decentralized network of extremist
Islamic groups and individuals rather than a unified military
organization. 10 To reduce or eliminate the threat they pose re-
quires the cooperation of the governments, police officers, and
individual citizens in the countries where Al Qaeda linked indi-
viduals and groups operate. Such help is necessary to obtain
intelligence, arrest, capture, prosecution, and extradition of al-
leged terrorists, not to mention to cut off their funds and to con-
fiscate their arms and other assets. The thesis of this article is
that to the extent the United States discriminates against or
otherwise unfairly treats Arabs and Muslims living here or
wishing to visit here, the more difficult it will be for the United
States to get the help we so desperately need not only in the
curity, Civil Liberties, and National Unity after September 11, in 80 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1193, 1195-96 (Aug. 25, 2003) (noting that the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC") "received over 700 complaints concerning Sep-
tember 11-related employment discrimination in the first 15 months after the
attacks"). In addition, hate crimes against Muslims "soared after September 11,
rising more than 1,500 percent [but] [t]he number of violent hate crimes has since
tapered off." Id. at 1195. See also United States, Hate Crimes Against Arabs and
Muslims and Persons Perceived to be Arab or Muslim After September 11, 14
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ANNUAL REPORT No. 6(g) (Nov. 2002) (noting that Arab and
Muslim organizations reported over 2,000 hate crimes and the FBI received a sev-
enteen fold increase in complaints of hate crimes in 2001 after September 11).
8 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
9 See Dan Balz & Bob Woodward, America's Chaotic Road to War; Bush's
Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack, WASH.
POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at Al. The destruction of the Afghan camps had "one perverse
and unintended effect[:] Terrorists and their supporters who had formerly been
concentrated in one known place were dispersed to home regions and new hideouts
like Chechnya, Yemen, East Africa and Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Regional com-
manders of Al Qaeda, says Rohan Gunaratna, author of a leading book on the net-
work, are now 'operating independently of centralized control' ... [and] no longer
depend on anything from bin Laden and his top brass except for ideological inspi-
ration." Michael Elliot, World: Why the War on Terror Will Never End; Bomb At-
tacks in Riyadh and Casablanca Suggest That Even on the Run, al-Qaeda is a
Resilient Threat to the West, 161 TIME MAG. no. 21, May 26, 2003, at 26, available
at 2003 WL 7740534.
10 See id.; see also infra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
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United States, but also in Arab and Muslim countries and com-
munities throughout the world.
II. "WAR ON TERRORISM," DANGEROUSLY
OVERBROAD RHETORIC
It has now become clear that the phrase "the war on terror-
ism" has not only become unthinkingly part of the lexicon but
also dangerously overbroad. One commentator put it aptly:
Wars have typically been fought against proper nouns (Germany,
say) for the good reason that proper nouns can surrender and
promise not to do it again. Wars against common nouns (poverty,
crime, drugs) have been less successful. Such opponents never
give up. The war on terrorism, unfortunately, falls into the sec-
ond category.1 1
Emergency measures put into effect because of the "war on ter-
rorism" may likewise never end and, by invoking such a broad
description of the threat, governmental officials may justify en-
forcement actions both at home and abroad that have little to do
with our immediate security. 12 The Executive's calculated use
of this broad and vague phrase, "the war on terrorism," which
the media have largely accepted without question, has led us
down some dangerous paths and is still leading us in scary di-
rections. Rather than claiming to fight the amorphous "war on
terrorism,"1 3 we should specifically name the enemy,1 4 Al
Qaeda, and those, like the Taliban, who lend support to Al
11 Granville Byford, The Wrong War, FOREIGN AFF., July.-Aug. 2002, at 34,
available at 2002 WL 2085047. Byford states that common nouns, such as "terror-
ism" (as in the "war on terrorism") are vague and imprecise whereas proper nouns,
"Germany" or "Iraq," for example, are concrete. When determining whether to use
armed force, involving the killing of human beings and the destruction of property,
government officials in a democracy have an obligation to identify with a reasona-
ble degree of definiteness the country, organization, or individuals who are the
object of the plan of attack. Cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
(requiring a criminal loitering statute to be reasonably definite).
12 For a thoughtful discussion of how to characterize this conflict, see gener-
ally Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2004 (arguing that it should not be considered a war, but a police action against a
criminal organization); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Com-
missions, 96 Am. J. INTL L. 328 (2002) (characterizing the devastation inflicted in
the September 11 attacks and the official response by NATO and the United States
as emblematic of a war).
13 Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status after 9/11, 28 YALE J. IN'L L. 325,
326-27 (2003) (noting that Al Qaeda does not even meet the definition of insur-
2004]
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Qaeda, and other individuals and groups, like Islamic Jihad,
that are allied with Al Qaeda. 15
Part I of this Article discusses the practices of the racial
profiling that the federal government has put in place after Sep-
tember 11. Part II of this Article discusses a history and analy-
sis of racial profiling both in the street crime context and in the
context of counter-terrorism. Part III of this article discusses
combating a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda and the link
both domestically and internationally to racial profiling of
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians.
III. ETHNIC AND RACIAL PROFILING IN THE WAKE
OF SEPTEMBER 11
Despite strong words from high-ranking government offi-
cials that the Executive Branch is not engaged in ethnic profil-
ing of Arabs and Muslims, 16 the policies and practices of
gency and, consequently, a "war" is not the proper legal description of an effort to
eradicate it). But see Wedgwood, supra note 12, at 328.
14 See Ruth Wedgwood, Cause for Alarm: Legal Action Can Bring Victories,
But Preventing Terrorism Calls for Tougher Tactics, WASH. POST, June 3, 2001, at
B01, available at 2001 WL 17633356 (arguing that the courts and law enforcement
alone cannot prevail against Al Qaeda and its allies).
15 See Richard Falk, Fawaz Gerges, George Lopez, William Nash, & Ruth
Wedgwood, The "War" on Terrorism: What Rules Apply? (New York Forum #1),
Dec. 17, 2001, available at http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/
prmID/147?PHPSESSID (Professor Falk defen~ds the notion of denominating the
conflict as a war, particularly against Afghanistan, but adds, "We also need to rely
on the 'Just War' framework to assess whether the kinds of undertakings that
occur in the post-Afghanistan phase of this war have any persuasive relationship
to the threat that was posed by the attack on September 11th and by the Osama
bin Laden visionary terrorism that lies behind it. In that sense, I am deeply op-
posed to any extension of military operations beyond Afghanistan. Any post-Af-
ghanistan efforts to address this threat of mega-terrorism should rely on a law
enforcement approach - that is, police cooperation with foreign governments, try-
ing to interdict financial support, trying to use covert operations - in order to
weaken the capacity of other portions of the global terrorist network to function").
But see Paust, supra note 13, at 326-27 (criticizing the characterization of the con-
flict against Al Qaeda as a "war").
16 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002).
To those who pit Americans against immigrants and citizens against non-
citizens, to those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost lib-
erty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode
our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to
America's enemies, and pause to America's friends.
Id. (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft's Dec. 6, 2001 address). I am in-
debted to Professor Cole for his leadership and inspiration in this area.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss1/3
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Executive departments belie that claim. Specifically, those de-
partments have carried out the following: (1) Arresting in mass
Arab and Muslim immigrants, 17 and carrying out Preventive
Detention;' 8 (2) Conducting secret (closed) immigration hear-
ings for these detainees;19 (3) (a) Requiring all male Arab and
Muslim nationals sixteen and older who have been residing
here with student visas, visitors' visas, and other temporary
visas to personally register with the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service ("INS");20 and (b) Requiring that visitors from
17 Id. at 961. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and Education Fund,
Wrong Then, Wrong Now, Racial Profiling before and after September 11, 2001, at
23, available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-profiling-re-
port.pdf [hereinafter Civil Rights and Education Fund] (noting that after Septem-
ber 11, the government "detained hundreds-perhaps thousands-of Arabs, South
Asians and Muslims on suspicion of terrorist activity.") Id. (citing Center for Nat'l
Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
18 Professor Cole estimated that 2,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants had been
held for months without charge by April 2002. See Cole, supra note 16, at 960. See
also Center for Nat'l Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 921 (D.C.
Cir. June 17, 2003) (noting that in the course of the post Sept. 11 investigation, the
government interviewed over 1,000 persons, detained 700 of them for violation of
immigration laws, 134 on federal criminal charges, and an undisclosed number as
material witnesses); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Treatment of Immi-
grants, Refugees, and Minorities, in A YEAR OF Loss, at http://www.lchr.org/us
law/loss/lossch3a.htm (last visited June 20, 2003).
19 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 23-25. See also Cole,
supra note 16, at 962.
20 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries,
67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31464912. This order,
issued by Attorney General John Ashcroft, required males from certain Muslim
countries to register in person at an INS office by December 16, 2002. The order
covered those males who are were over the age of sixteen and who held tourist
visas, business visitor visas, student visas and other temporary visas. The order
applied to "nationals or citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan or Syria .... " Id. An
"alien" who does not comply with this order commits an immigration law violation
and is subject to deportation. Id. ("A willful failure to comply with the require-
ments of this Notice constitutes a failure to maintain nonimmigrant status under
section 237(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i)"). See 8 CFR 214.1(f).
See also Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 51 n.27
(2003). Attorney General Ashcroft issued similar orders covering nationals from
other Arab and Muslim countries as well as from North Korea. See Registration of
Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,526
(Nov. 22, 2002) (requiring males, sixteen and older, from Afghanistan, Algeria,
Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates and Yemen to register by January 10, 2003). See also Re-
gistration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed.
Reg. 77,136 (Dec. 16, 2002); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from
Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,642 (ordering male nationals 16 and above,
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Arab and other selected countries be fingerprinted, photo-
graphed, and subject to an interrogation under oath at ports of
entry;21 (4) Changing priority for deporting "aliens," namely,
the INS's seeking to deport 6,000 from Arab countries first,
ahead of the 314,000 foreign nationals who have absconded;22
(5) The Justice Department's interviewing 5,000-8,000 young
immigrant men based solely on their age, date of arrival, and
country from which they have come, all being either Arabs or
Muslims; 23 and (6) Enlisting state and local police to enforce
immigration laws, thereby implicitly encouraging those police
forces to engage in more traditional racial profiling of Arabs,
Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians, namely, by stopping for
questioning and investigation Arab appearing drivers and
pedestrians. 24 All these policies and practices will be examined
in turn.
A. Mass Arrests and Preventive Detention of Arab and
Muslim Immigrants
Within a matter of weeks after September 11, the federal
government began to arrest a large number of primarily Arab
from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to register between January 13, 2003 and Febru-
ary 21, 2003).
21 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 25-26.
22 DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men for Al Qaeda Haven Countries, in
79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 115, 115-16 (Jan. 21, 2002); Cole, supra note 16, at 975
(citing Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Fugitive De-
portees; Middle Eastern Men Are Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at Al).
23 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 24-25. The mandatory
interrogation program required Arab men who had entered the United States on
non-immigrant visas before January 1, 2000 to report to the Department of Home-
land Security for questioning. (Non-immigrant visas include student visas, tourist
visas, business visas, and other temporary visas). Id. Although Attorney General
John Ashcroft apparently stated that the interviews were to be "voluntary and
friendly," a Department of Justice Memorandum authorized holding "interested"
individuals on bond. Id. at 25 n.104 (citing Memo Adds to Suspicions of Immi-
grants on Interviews, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 29, 2001). This is not to mention continued
incommunicado indefinite detention of Arabs and Muslims in Guantanamo Bay.
The focus of this discussion, however, is on the treatment of Arabs and Muslims in
the United States.
24 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 22-23. See also
DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men for Al Qaeda Haven Countries, supra note
22, at 116 (quoting the Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee ("ADC"))
("The ADC stressed that [the government] has the right to remove persons who are
not in the country legally but said that it is 'unconscionable' to proceed 'based on a
hierarchy that is ethnically defined'").
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss1/3
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and Muslim immigrants. 25 The federal government stopped re-
porting the number when it reached 1,147,26 but at least 1,200
persons were arrested and later charged with immigration vio-
lations.27 One scholar estimates that 2,000 had been arrested
by April 2002.28 A significant additional number of individuals
were held as "material witnesses."29 Only a handful of the de-
tentions ultimately resulted in arrests for terrorist offenses. 30
Many of the detainees were held for weeks or months without
charge.31 Few were permitted initial access to counsel.32 Some
against whom orders of deportation or voluntary departure had
already been served and entered were still held by the INS,
even though they had been scheduled to leave the country.33
Preventive detention generally is not permitted in the United
States, but it was essentially carried out against some of these
detainees:
25 Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, "Migration Regulation Goes Local:
The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy:" Race, Civil Rights, and Immigra-
tion Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 295, 331 (2002) (citing, inter alia, David E. Rovella,
Clock Ticks on 9/11 Detentions, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at Al).
26 See Cole, supra note 16, at 960.
27 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1194.
28 Cole, supra note 16, at 960.
29 See Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 327 (noting that a large number of
Arab and Muslim citizens were put into custody as "material witnesses" in the
aftermath of 9/11). One study found that "nearly 50 people" have been detained as
material witnesses since September 11. See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at
1195.
30 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1194-95.
31 Cole, supra note 16, at 962 (citing Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International's
Concerns Regarding Post September 11 Detentions in the USA (Mar. 14, 2002),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510442002); Dan Eg-
gen, Delays Cited in Charging Detainees; With Legal Latitude, INS Sometimes
Took Weeks, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2002, at Al; Dan Eggen, Long Wait for Filing of
Charges Common for Sept. 11 Detainees; Delays Reasonable, INS Officials Say,
WASH. POST, JAN. 19, 2002, at A12). See also Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at
1194 (noting that of the 406 detainees from whom information was available, over
half were held "for more than five weeks. Almost nine percent were detained for
more than nine months before being released or repatriated").
32 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1194 ("Many of these detainees
had severe problems notifying or communicating with their family members and
lawyers or arranging for representation at all").
33 Cole, supra note 16, at 964. See also Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at
1194 ("Of the detainees for whom such information was available, approximately
52 percent were believed to be subject to a Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
hold, preventing their repatriation for weeks or months even after they were or-
dered removed from the U.S. and did not appeal").
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[Of all those arrested, 7521 were charged with immigration viola-
tions. These so- called "special interest" immigration detainees
were presumed guilty of links to terrorism and incarcerated for
months until the government "cleared" them of such connections.
By February 2002, the Department of Justice acknowledged that
most of the original "special interest" detainees were no longer of
interest to its anti-terrorist efforts, and none were indicted for
crimes related to the September 11 attacks. Most were deported
for visa violations. 34
One study of the detentions revealed that more than one-third
of the detainees for whom information was available came from
either Egypt or Pakistan. 35 The researchers were unable to find
any rational basis for targeting nationals from these two coun-
tries.36 Perhaps more troubling, the researchers found that the
arrest of foreign nationals from Muslim countries did not ap-
pear to be based on an official policy of racial profiling but upon
private citizens, engaging in racial profiling themselves, who
phoned in tips to law enforcement agents about Muslims or
Muslim looking individuals living in their communities or
places of work.37 Apparently, law enforcement personnel acqui-
esced in the practice of racial profiling by picking up those
whom citizens had identified. 38
B. Conducting Secret (Closed) Immigration Hearings for the
Arab and Muslim Immigrants Who Were Arrested and
Detained
The public, the press, and family members have been ex-
cluded from virtually all immigration hearings conducted for
these immigrants. 39 Before September 11, immigration judges
had the discretion to close immigration hearings on a case-by-
34 Alison Parker & Jamie Fellner, Above the Law: Executive Power after Sep-
tember 11 in the United States, in HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004
(2004), available at http://hrw.org/wr2k4/8.htm#_Toc58744957.
35 Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1194.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. The study also showed that the "majority of noncitizens detained since
September 11 ... had spouses, children, or other family relationships in the U.S."
Id.
39 See Cole, supra note 16, at 961. See also Memorandum from the Chief Im-
migration Judge, infra note 41 and accompanying Instructions to Immigration
Judges.
[Vol. 16:19
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case basis. Generally, immigration hearings were not closed. 40
The Attorney General, however, changed the rule, requiring im-
migration judges to close the proceedings at the request of the
prosecutor.41 Apparently, the Justice Department ordered all
the prosecutors to make such a request in these post September
11 cases. 42 Attorneys representing the immigrants during the
closed hearings reported that no classified information had
been introduced in the hearings. 43 Although due process is
more limited in immigration hearings than in a criminal trial,
the principle of public trials and hearings is fundamental.
44 It
should only be deviated from in cases of extreme necessity. The
blanket approach here, where virtually every one of these immi-
grants had a closed proceeding, on its face violates that princi-
ple, particularly absent any apparent demonstrated need for
the closures in all these cases.45
40 See North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299-
300 (D. N.J. 2002) (noting that the immigration regulations promulgated since
1964 created a presumption that deportation hearings would be open) (citing 8
C.F.R. § 242.16(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 3.27), rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (holding that the INS may close so-called "special
interest" immigration deportation hearings).
41 Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Law Judge, to All
Immigration Judges (Sept. 21, 2001), in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1836 (Dec. 3,
2001). The memorandum states as follows: "[T]he Attorney General has imple-
mented additional security procedures for certain cases in the Immigration Court.
Those procedures require us to hold the hearings individually, to close the hear-
ing[s] to the public, and to avoid discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any
information about the case to anyone outside the Immigration Court." Id. (empha-
sis added). The instructions that were subsequently issued state in part as follows:
"The courtroom must be closed for these cases.., no visitors, no family, no press."
Instructions for Cases Requiring Additional Security, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1837 (Dec. 3, 2001).
42 See id.; but see Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 321 (noting that by
1999, the government used secret evidence in 25 removal proceedings brought
against Arab and Muslim immigrants).
43 See Cole, supra note 16, at 961.
44 See id. See also Richmond Newspapers Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980).
45 The Sixth Circuit noted as follows:
Nothing in the Creppy directive counsels that it is limited to "a small seg-
ment of particularly dangerous individuals." In fact, the Government so
much as argues that certain non-citizens known to have no links to terror-
ism will be designated "special interest" cases. Supposedly, closing a more
targeted class would allow terrorists to draw inferences from which hear-
ings are open and which are closed.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that INS
may not close "special interest" immigration deportation cases).
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Aside from closing the immigration hearings, the Justice
Department has conducted the proceedings against these immi-
grants in virtually unparalleled secrecy.46 "Chief Immigration
Judge Michael Creppy has instructed immigration judges not to
list the cases on the public docket, and to refuse to confirm or
deny that they even exist."47 The Justice Department has re-
fused to disclose the names of those it detained. 48 The United
States Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in a case
challenging that decision.49
1. Requiring Arab and Muslim Immigrants who have been
residing here with student visas, visitors visas, and
other temporary visas to personally register with the
immigration authorities
During the Iran Hostage crisis, all Iranian students study-
ing in the United States were required to report to the INS.50
As a result, the INS deported a significant number of Irani-
ans.51 The Justice Department issued a similar order, under its
"Special Registration" Program, part of the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System ("NSEERS"),52 requiring that
the following personally appear at Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion offices: foreign born males, sixteen years of age or older,
from almost exclusively Arab and Muslim countries, who hold
student visas, visitors' visas, and other temporary visas. 53 Ap-
46 See Instructions for Cases Requiring Additional Security, supra note 41, at
1837 ("This restriction on information includes confirming or denying whether
such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing ... You should instruct all
courtroom personnel, including both court employees and contract interpreters,
that they are not to discuss the case with anyone").
47 Id. See also Cole, supra note 16, at 961 (citing Memorandum from Chief
Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, supra note 41).
48 See Cole, supra note 16, at 960.
49 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
50 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1981). See also Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (upholding INS regulations requiring Iranian students to report to the
INS).
51 See Shoaee v. INS, 704 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding an Iranian
student's deporation).
52 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries,
67 Fed. Reg. 67,766, 67,7667 (Nov. 6, 2002).
53 See State Department Press Releases and Documents, New Entry-Exit Sys-
tem to Focus on Individuals, Not 'Broad Categories,' FED. NEWS & INFO. DISPATCH,
Dec. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 64739209. There are three components to Na-
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parently, the Justice Department planned to have the program
cover all foreign visitors, but it started with Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Sudan, Libya and North Korea, all Arab and Muslim countries
except North Korea.54 The Department established four groups
from the following countries that were required to come in and
register at designated dates: "[I] Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and
Syria; [II] Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Mo-
rocco North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates and Yemen; [III] Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Jordan and Kuwait; and [IV] Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. '55
The first registration deadline was in December 2002;56
the registration deadline for the first two groups ended Feb-
ruary 7, 2003. 5 7 The third group's deadline was March 21,
2003,58 and the fourth group's deadline was April 25, 2003. 59
tional Security Entry-Exit Registration System: the "Special Registration" pro-
gram described above; the "Point of Entry Registration," [hereinafter POE] for
those who are at the point of entering the country; and "Exit-Departure" controls
for those who are leaving the country. Id. at 1. The POE program is described
infra notes 65 to 71 and accompanying text. See also Davies, supra note 20, at 51
n.27 (2003) (noting that Attorney General John Ashcroft "instituted special regis-
tration requirements known as the National Security Entry-Exit Registration Sys-
tem (NSEERS) that require select individuals to be fingerprinted, photographed,
and interviewed under oath at United States ports-of-entry. These registration
requirements were subsequently extended to nationals of certain designated coun-
tries who had already been permitted to enter the United States .... These Regis-
tration requirements affect non-immigrant aliens from four groups of countries:
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria; Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Leba-
non, Morocco North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates
and Yemen; Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait; and Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan"). Professor Davies also notes that the FBI appears to be openly
investigating Arab and Muslims in the United States. See id. (citing Eric Licht-
blau, FBI Tells Offices to Count Local Muslims and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2003, at A13).
54 See Davies, supra note 20, at 51 n.27.
55 Id. See also State Department Press Release on New Exit-Entry System,
supra note 53, at 2.
56 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries,
67 Fed. Reg. 67,766, 67,767 (Nov. 6, 2002).
57 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens From Designated Countries,
67 Fed. Reg. 77,136, 77,137 (Dec. 16, 2002). See also Permission for Certain Non-
immigrant Aliens From Designated Countries to Register in a Timely Fashion, 68
Fed. Reg. 2,366 (Jan. 16, 2003) (reopening the registration period for the first two
groups, extending the time for them to register to Feb. 7, 2003).
58 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Counties,
68 Fed. Reg. 2,363-03, 2,364 (Jan. 16, 2003) (requiring the specified nationals from
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait to register by March 28, 2003).
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Although the Justice Department initially assured those
subject to the call-in registration program that the purpose of
the registration was to track foreigners and to obtain leads on
terrorists, the Department algo used the registration process to
determine if those registering had violated immigration regula-
tions. Apparently, 500 to 1000 individuals "were detained" af-
ter registering on December 10, 2003 "in the Los Angles/Orange
County area alone ...."60
The program, however, apparently yielded little in the way
of arrests for terrorist crimes. See table below.
a. Mandatory Registration and Detention Data
Number of Arab and Muslim Immigrants 82,58161
Registered
Number of Notices of Appear Issued (charging 13,153
immigration law Violations)
Number of Arab and Muslim Immigrants 2,761
Detained Overall
Number Deported (although BICS noted that 2
many have taken Voluntary departure and
many are still in proceedings)
Number Charged with Terrorism Related Crimes 062
Although the ethnic profiling of Arabs and Muslims may have
yielded intelligence63 (but not arrests), these figures do suggest
that the crude tool of profiling may not be greatly advancing the
government's cause against Al Qaeda and its allies.64
59 Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries,
68 Fed. Reg. 8,046, 8,047 (Feb. 19, 2003) (extending the previous deadline). See
also State Department Press Release on New Exit-Entry System, supra note 53, at
2.
60 Id. Such a policy may be counter-productive for other reasons. Individuals
who have information about terrorist activity, but who have minor immigration
infractions may decide not to register or to cooperate with authorities. Id.
61 As of December 2, 2003 when the Department of State announced that the
Special Registration Program was to end, 83,519 individuals had been registered.
State Department Press Release on New Entry-Exit System, supra note 53, at 2.
62 Data from Asian American Legal Defense Fund, citing to the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly part of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service), current as of May 11, 2003.
63 It is not known what intelligence leads, if any, have come from these vari-
ous programs.
64 Michael Janofsky, 9/11 Panel Calls Policies On Immigration Ineffective,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2004, at A8 (9/11 Commission's preliminary report concluded,
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2. Requiring that visitors from Arab and other selected
countries be fingerprinted, photographed, and subject to
an interrogation under oath at ports-of-entry
A second aspect of the National Security Entry-Exit Regis-
tration System required selected individuals at various points
of entry to be fingerprinted, photographed, and subject to inter-
rogation under oath.65 Again this program targeted foreigners
from the same twenty-four Arab and Muslim countries, with the
addition of North Korea.66 These controls applied to students,
tourists, business visitors, and other temporary visa holders. 67
After considerable protest on the part of the Arab-American
community and others, the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") decided to abolish the mandatory annual re-registra-
tion requirement, under the Special Registration Program or
under the Port of Entry ("POE") program, effective December 2,
2003.68 Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary,
Asa Hutchinson said that DHS "'will utilize a more tailored sys-
tem that is individual-specific rather than the broad categories
[of people] by geography.' ' 69 By September 30, 2003, 177,260
people had registered with the NSEERS program as a whole.
among other things, that these programs racially profiling Arabs and Muslims in
the United States were.a failure).
65 See Davies, supra note 20, at 51 n.27.
66 See id. See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
67 These measures were subsequently expanded under the US-VISIT program
to include other countries, Brazil being among the countries on the list. Irate at
these security measures, a Brazilian judge ordered that all visitors from the Un-
tied States to Brazil be subject to the same treatment. See Audrey Hudson & S.A.
Miller, U.S. Requires Fingerprints, Photos From Foreign Visitors, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2004, at A01. The U.S. Visit program requires biometric identification of
all visitors and non-immigrants, including foreigners entering the United States to
study here. Implementation of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology Program ("US-Visit"); Biometric Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg.
468, 468 (Jan. 5, 2004). The DHS plans to expand this program to include visitors
from all countries. It appears that it essentially will supplant NSEERS. Id. at
476.
68 State Dep't Press Release on New Exit-Entry Procedures, supra note 53, at
1; Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements From the Special
Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,578 (Dec. 2,
2003) (to be codified as 8 C.F.R. Part 264) ("Supplementary Information" section
for this interim rule states that DHS "will use a more tailored system in which it
will notify individual aliens of future registration requirements"). By the way, the
DHS absorbed the INS on March 1, 2003.
69 See State Dep't Press Release on New Exit-Entry Procedures, supra note
53, at 1.
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They will not have to re-register annually as had been required
under the original program. 70 Exit controls, however, for these
individuals remain in effect. 71
C. Changing priority for deporting "aliens," namely, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's seeking to
deport 6,000 from Arab countries first, ahead of the
314,000 foreign nationals who have absconded
At first glance, the so-called "Absconder Apprehension Ini-
tiative" appears to be a sound enforcement tactic. Of the esti-
mated 314,000 foreign born from nations around the world who
have removal orders against them, the government has
targeted the approximately 6,000 from Arab and Muslim coun-
tries first.72 The September 11 hijackers and Al Qaeda were
Arab and Muslim. The argument runs that other members of
Al Qaeda might be among the 6,000 from these selected "Al
Qaeda harboring" countries. 73
The difficulty is that the targeted persons are being singled
out solely because of their nationality. This kind of racial profil-
ing has apparently yielded little, if any, intelligence or arrests
for terrorism offenses, when employed in the call-in registration
program or in the "voluntary" interview program. 74 The Ab-
sconder Initiative has apparently been equally fruitless. A re-
port of the Presidential Commission investigating the
September 11 attacks expressly found as follows: "[W]e have
not learned that any of the absconders were deported under a
terrorism statute, prosecuted for terrorist-related crimes or
70 See Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements From the
Special Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, supra note 68, at 67,581.
71 Id. at 67,580. See also Kathleen Taylor, Editorial, SEATTLE POST INTELLI-
GENCER, Dec. 18, 2003 (noting that temporary immigrants from the named 25
countries have to leave the United States from designated points of entry and must
register upon leaving the country).
72 Middle Eastern "Absconders" to be Rounded Up, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL.
No. 5, Mar. 1, 2002, at 264. It is estimated that approximately 1,000 of the 6,000
absconders have felony convictions. They will be targeted for deportation first;
then the rest will follow. Id.
73 American Immigration Lawyers Association, Boiling the Frog Slowly: Exec-
utive Branch Actions Since September 11, 2001, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. No. 20,
Oct. 15, 2002, at 1237. INS Commissioner Ziglar announced the initiative in De-
cember 2001. Id.
74 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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linked in any way to terrorism."75 As some commentators have
noted, including the former Commissioner of the INS, "This [ab-
sconder initiative] has marginal security benefits, while further
equating national origin with dangerousness." 76 Furthermore,
there is every reason to believe that Arabs and Muslims living
here or abroad will see this as yet another example of American
government blatantly discriminating against individuals with
Arab and Islamic backgrounds. 77
D. The Justice Department Task Force's interviewing 5,000-
8,000 young immigrant men based solely on their age,
date of arrival, and country from which they have
come, all being either Arabs or Muslims
The Justice Department also initiated a Task Force pro-
gram to "voluntarily" interview 5,000 immigrant men, between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-three, who came almost exclu-
sively from Arab or Muslim countries and who entered the
United States after January 1, 2000.78 The program was ex-
panded to include an additional 3,000. The Task Force was
composed not only of Justice Department personnel, but also of
local and state police officers. 79 Nominally to obtain leads on
terrorism both here and abroad, a Justice Department memo
suggests that the voluntary interviews also had the purpose of
potentially arresting suspicious interviewees and those who had
75 Janofsky, supra note 64, at A8. The Commission reported that as of "early
2003, 1,139 had been apprehended, a group that included 803 who had been de-
ported, 224 who were awaiting deportation and 45 who were prosecuted on other
criminal charges .... ." Id.
76 Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1195.
77 Cam Simpson, Flynn McRoberts and Liz Sly, Immigration Crackdown
Shatters Muslims' Lives, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2003, at C1. Cf Geneive Abdo &
E.A. Torriero, Spy Charges Dropped, but Fear Remains; Chaplain's Kin Feel 'Like
the Enemy', CHIC. TRIB., May 3, 2004, at 1 (although espionage charges were
dropped against Army Capt. James Yee for allegedly mishandling classified docu-
ments in Guantanamo Bay, Muslims feel targeted by the government).
78 Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 334 (citing DOJ Orders Incentives,
'Voluntary'Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists; Foreign Students, Visa
Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816, 1817-17
(2001)).
79 DOJ Orders Incentives, 'Voluntary' Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on
Terrorists; Foreign Students, Visa Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, supra
note 78, at 1817-18.
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violated immigration laws.80  Apparently, approximately
twenty have been arrested as a result of the interviews."'
Before the interviews, the authorities apparently lacked either
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that any of these immi-
grants had committed immigration violations, let alone that
they were engaged in terrorist crimes or knew about terrorist
activities. The basis of the interviews was the nationality of the
targeted persons, plus their gender, age and time of entry.
E. Enlisting state and local police in immigration
enforcement, implicitly encouraging those police forces
to engage in more traditional racial profiling of
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs and South Asians, namely,
by stopping for questioning and investigating Arab
appearing drivers and pedestrians8 2
Before September 11, state and local police were generally
precluded from enforcing the civil provisions of immigration
80 Akram & Johnson, supra note 25, at 334 (citing Memorandum from the
Deputy Attorney General, to all United States Attorneys and all Members of the
Anti-terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001), reprinted in DOJ Orders Incentives,
"Voluntary" Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists, Foreign Students,
Visa Processing Under State Dept. Scrutiny, supra note 78, at app. The memoran-
dum states in relevant part as follows: "While the primary purpose of these inter-
views is not to ascertain the legality of the individuals' immigration status, the
federal responsibility to enforce the immigration laws, as exercised by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service is an important one. Therefore, if you suspect
that a particular individual may be in violation of the federal immigration laws,
you should call the INS representative on your Anti-Terrorism Task Force or the
INS officials at the closest Law Enforcement Support Center. Those officials will
advise you whether the individual is in violation of the immigration laws and
whether he should be detained." Id. at 1829, 1830.
81 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 24-25. The approxi-
mately 20 who were detained were held for immigration violations, not for terror-
ist linked offenses. Id. The Department planned on interviewing approximately
5,000 in 2001 and 3,000 in 2002; approximately 90 percent appeared. Id. Al-
though it is not known whether any useful leads concerning terrorist activity were
obtained from those who reported, there is little reported evidence to suggest that
the questioning of Arab men provided substantial intelligence on terrorists. Id.
Some police departments refused to participate in the interrogations, because of
concerns about racial profiling. See id. n.106 (citing Fox Butterfield, Police are
Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at B7) (quoting
the Seattle chief of police who states that racial profiling was a sensitive problem
because "[w]e don't want to harm relationships with community members that we
have worked for years to build [since] [we depend on information that these people
bring to us when they come to trust us").
82 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 22-23.
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laws.8 3 Reasons for discouraging local policing in this area in-
cluded the complexity of immigration law, an area that is gener-
ally outside a police officer's training and knowledge, and the
risk of discriminatory enforcement of the law against people of
color and other "foreign looking" individuals8 4 The Justice De-
partment, however, changed that policy, enlisting the aid of
state and local police to enforce the immigration laws.8 5 For ex-
ample, the Justice Department added to the FBI's National
Crime Information ("NCIC") Database, the names of more than
83 See Kevin Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral
Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 863 n.90 (2003) (citing DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably
exclusively a federal power") (citations omitted)); see, e.g., League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that most of
Proposition 187, a California law seeking to effectively regulate undocumented im-
migration, was preempted by federal law). But see Peter J. Spiro, The States and
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121 (1994) (con-
tending that states should have an increased role in immigration regulation). See
also Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restrict-
ing Local Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L. J. 50, 66 (1994)
(citing a 1989 Memorandum of Understanding between the INS and the City of
San Francisco, agreeing that the San Francisco police will not enforce the federal
immigration law). But see Paul Smith, An Argument Against Mandatory Report-
ing of Undocumented Immigrants, 29 COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 147 (1995) (noting
that although generally prohibited from enforcing the civil provisions of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act, there exists no constitutional preemption for state
and local police from enforcing the criminal provisions of the INA) (citing Gonzales
v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 469, 475 (9th Cir. 1983); Gates v. Superior Court, 193
Cal. App. 3d 205, 214-15 (1987); Hawley, The Powers of Local Law Enforcement to
Enforce Immigration Laws, 99-6 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (June 1999).
84 See Mithre J. Sandrasagra, U.S.: Rights Groups Fight Use in Immigration
Cases, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 66986827; see
also Linda Reyna Yanez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforce-
ment of Immigration Law, 1 Hisp. L. J. 9, 12 (1994) (noting that local police en-
forcement risks violating the rights of United States citizens, legal residents, and
aliens); Johnson, supra note 83, at 363-64 (noting patterns of the police abuse of
undocumented immigrants).
85 DOJ Legal Opinion Would Broaden Use of State, Local Personnel in Immi-
gration Enforcement, in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 519 (Apr. 8, 2002) (noting that
the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel is issuing an opinion permitting local police to
enforce the civil provisions of the Immigration laws, reversing its 1996 opinion).
See also Marie Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post September 11, Safeguarding
the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern American and Immigrant Communities, 17
GEO. L. J. 63, 91 (2002) (citing Eric Schmidt, Ruling Clears Way to Use State Police
in Immigration Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15). The House is debating a
bill that would expressly authorize state and local police to enforce immigration
laws. See House Subcommittee Debates Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
under Proposed CLEAR Act, in 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1407 (Oct. 13, 2003);
H.R. 2671, 149 Cong. Rec. H6463 (daily ed. July 9, 2003).
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300,000 "aliens" who remained in the country despite deporta-
tion or removal orders.8 6 Local law enforcement personnel can
access the NCIC.8 7 The INS Commissioner explained that this
policy change would enable local and state police to help with
"removal efforts."8 8 Furthermore, the Justice Department
asked local police forces to help interview 8,000 Muslim males,
as noted in the previous section.8 9
Although using the local police to enforce immigration reg-
ulations in the wake of September 11 may appear superficially
reasonable, such a policy raises serious questions. 90 "Co-opting
state and local police to make immigration arrests undermines
public safety and encourages racial profiling."91 It discourages
undocumented immigrants from coming forward to help the po-
86 See INS Commissioner Announces Data Sharing Arrangement with the
FBI, Other Security Measures, in 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1899 (Dec. 17, 2001)
(citing Chris Adams, INS to Put in Federal Criminal Databases the Names of Peo-
ple Ordered Deported, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001, at A22).
87 Id. ("Sharing this information with the FBI will allow local law enforcement
personnel to assist with removal efforts").
88 Id.
89 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1195 ("Problems occurred [in the
'voluntary interview' program] when poorly trained police officials were tasked to
implement the program").
90 In testifying before Congress, Members of the Mexican Legal Defense Fund
noted:
Immigrants, generally, prefer not to draw attention to themselves from
the government or the private sector even if they are here legally. This
explains, in part, why Latino immigrants under-report when they are the
victims of crime or when they are the victim of illegal civil practices, such
as employment discrimination, unsafe working environments, or housing
discrimination even though they experience these practices in significant
numbers. Current trends post-9/11 to involve local law enforcement in en-
forcing immigration laws, particularly civil laws, will only drive Latino
immigrant communities further underground and make them less willing
to provide information to law enforcement that would be helpful in solving
crimes and resolving legal violations that affect not just Latinos but
others with whom they work and live. It will also lead to less cooperation
from immigrant communities with law enforcement searching for leads to
fight terrorism.
INS Interior Enforcement Strategy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims Interior Enforcement Strategy, 107th
Cong. (June 19, 2002) (statement of Marisa J. Demeo, Regional Counsel, and Aisha
Qaasim, Legislative Staff Attorney, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund (MALDEF)), available at 2002 WL 20318304 (emphasis added).
91 Sandrasagra, supra note 84 (quoting Raul Yzaguirre, president and CEO of
the National Council of La Raza).
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lice solve crimes. 92 Numerous police departments, the National
Association of Counties, and the National League of Cities have
taken stands against using state and local police to make immi-
gration arrests. 93
Unfortunately, there appears to be substantial evidence
that state and local police are engaging in racial profiling of
Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians.94 As in the case of
profiling of Blacks and Latinos, many local police are appar-
ently stopping Arab looking drivers pretextually, solely or in
part because of their appearance. 95 Arab looking individuals
are also being stopped or questioned in other places at least in
part because of their ethnicity. 96
IV. RAcIAL PROFILING: A HISTORY AND AN ANALYSIS
A. September 11 as Justifying Racial Profiling
Given the nationality of the authors of the September 11
attacks, why should we not target immigrants and visitors from
Arab and Muslim countries for investigation, prosecution, and
deportation? After all, there may be other sleeper Al Qaeda
cells here in the United States. 97 Furthermore, Arab, Muslims,
and their organizations may be financing terror groups against
US.
92 See Johnson, supra note 83, at 864.
93 Sandrasagra, supra note 84.
94 See Teresa Watanabe, Anti-Muslim Incidents Rise, Study Finds; Group
Says Hate Crimes and Harassment in California Tripled in 2003 from Previous
Year, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at B1; Mary Beth Sheridan, Bias Against Muslims
Up 70%; Radio Talk Shows, Iraq War Among Reasons, Study Finds, WASH. POST,
May 3, 2004, at A12.
95 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 22-23 (discussing
cases of "Driving while Arab (or Arab looking)").
96 See id. at 23. Aside from this local profiling, "flying while Arab," the profil-
ing of Arab and Muslim airline passengers by private screeners and now govern-
mental officials, has reached unprecedented heights. Id. at 27-28. See also Charu
A. Chandrasekhar, Note & Comment: Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights
Remedies to Post-9/11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 AsiAN L. J. 215
(2003).
97 "[If the people that are flying your airplanes into buildings are from the
Middle East, you don't look for New Zealanders." Chandrasekhar, supra note 96,
at 223 n.48 (quoting Nurith C. Aizenman, Middle Eastern Travelers Face Scrutiny;
Arab American Activist Attacks Lengthy Interrogations as Profiling, Doubts Useful-
ness, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at All (quoting a former security head of the
Federal Aviation Administration)).
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For example, Stuart Taylor has opposed racial profiling
black drivers for drugs, "Driving While Black" (DWB). He ar-
gues, however, that racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims is jus-
tified in airports, because inter alia "preventing mass murder
... is [an] infinitely more important rationale than the ratio-
nale behind DWB profiling (finding illegal drugs or guns) [and]
[a] virulent perversion of Islam is, so far, the only mass move-
ment in the world so committed to mass-murdering Americans
that its fanatics are willing to kill themselves in the process
[and that some of these people] have lived legally in America for
years ... ,"98 Taylor adds that "DWB is singularly race-based,
which contravenes both the letter and the spirit of the Constitu-
tion. Airport profiling takes multiple factors into account, such
as when the ticket was purchased, how the subject responds to
questions, etc."99
This argument, however, fails to recognize how crude the
device of racial profiling is, the ease with which Osama bin
Laden and Al Qaeda can circumvent it,1°° the corrosive effect it
can have on Arabs and Muslims and Middle Eastern appearing
men living here and abroad, and how much it creates the per-
ception of an American anti-Arab and anti-Muslim animus' 01
both at home and in other parts of the world.
History may help explain why both this intuitive and rea-
soned justification of ethnic profiling is wrong. In World War II,
98 R. Spencer Macdonald, Notes & Comments: Rational Profiling in America's
Airports, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 113, 126 (2002) (citing Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for
Using Racial Profiling at Airports, ATLANTIC, Sept. 25, 2001, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor200l-09-25.htm).
99 Id.
100 Cf. Ruth Wedgwood, The Enemy Within, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at
A12, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3397712 (noting that Al Qaeda can circumvent
watch-lists (and presumably profiles) by recruiting American citizens).
101 The Department of Transportation issued a policy statement less than a
month after September 11 prohibiting racial profiling by airlines: "Do not subject
persons or their property to inspection, search and/or detention solely because they
appear to be Arab, Middle Eastern, Asian, and/or Muslim; or solely because they
speak Arabic, Farsi, or another foreign language; or solely because they speak with
an accent that may lead you to believe they are Arab, Middle Eastern, Asian, and!
or Muslim." Chandrasekhar, supra note 96, at 218 (quoting Policy Statement, U.S.
Dep't of Transp. Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings, Carrying Out
Transportation Inspection and Safety Responsibilities in a Nondiscriminatory
Manner (Oct. 12, 2001) (emailed to airline trade associations and major U.S. air-
lines on Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/rules/20011012.
htm ).
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we interned 110,000 to 120,000 people of Japanese descent, in-
cluding 70,000 American citizens. 10 2 We interned relatively few
German Americans and Italian Americans during that
conflict. 0 3
Americans generally regard the internments as a blot on
our history. Nearly every member presently serving on the
United States Supreme Court has condemned Korematsu v.
United States,'0 4 the decision that upheld the Japanese intern-
ments against constitutional attack. Congress has condemned
the program and enacted legislation, authorizing reparations to
surviving victims.10 5
But perhaps most significant for this analysis, few, if any,
Japanese-Americans or Japanese immigrants ever engaged in
espionage, sabotage, or acts against the United States during
World War II.10 6 Unlike the present "war against terrorism,"
the United States had declared war against the enemy, Japan,
and, at least the non-citizen Japanese immigrants then residing
here theoretically owed their allegiance to that country. 0 7 De-
102 Frank H. Wu, Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of Jap-
anese American Internment, 17 CRIM. JUST. 52, 52-53 (2002).
103 Evelyn Nieves, Past Recalled for Japanese-Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2001, at A26 (noting that aside from more than 120,000 ethnic Japanese internees,
the United States government interned, during World War II, "nearly 11,000
Germans and German-Americans and 2,000 Italians"). As heinous a crime as Sep-
tember 11 was, it pales in comparison with World War II. In that conflict Ameri-
cans alone lost 292,131 to battle deaths and 115,187 to deaths from other causes.
World War I1, 27 FUNK & WAGNALLS ENCYCLOPEDIA 448 (1986). Total Allied civil-
ian and military losses were 44 million, those of the Axis were 11 million. Id.
104 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also Cole, supra note
16, at 993 n.165.
105 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989a (1988) (apologizing for the
internments and providing restitution to the victims). See also Teresa Watanabe,
Donor Fund UCLA Chair on WWII Internment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at B1.
106 See Wu, supra note 102, at 55; see also Robert Pear, $1.5 Billion Urged For
Japanese Held in War, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1983, at Al. Although a Congres-
sional Commission investigating the internments found that the United States
had intercepted Japanese diplomatic cables indicating that they were employing
some ethnic Japanese in the United States for espionage, the Commission con-
cluded that "'no documented acts of espionage, sabotage or fifth-column activity
were shown to have been committed'" by ethnic Japanese in this country. Id.
107 See The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6, 1955),
available at 1955 WL 1 (noting that nationality denotes a "bond of allegiance" by
the national to his or her country).
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spite that presumption,108 nationality and ethnicity actually
provided little basis for demonstrating that the individuals in-
volved posed a threat to us.
B. United States Practice of Racial Profiling Before
September 11
Well before September 11, the United States had an unfor-
tunate history with race relations generally and, more specifi-
cally, with allowing the police to pick out, stop, question, and
investigate individuals based wholly or in part on their race.109
Many police throughout the country often routinely stopped
black and Latino drivers, suspecting (or hoping) to find evidence
of drugs or other crimes.110 In the last five years, however, ra-
cial profiling has been increasingly attacked. DWB, a descrip-
tion of the police practice of routinely stopping black male
drivers, has been roundly condemned.1 Picking individuals
108 National and international law permit the detention of "enemy aliens" dur-
ing wartime. See Cole, supra note 16, at 959 (citing the Enemy Alien Act of 1798).
109 The Supreme Court has upheld the use of pretextual traffic stops in an
effort to catch what the police suspect to be individuals who have engaged in crimi-
nal activity. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). "Racial profiling is
any use of race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin by law enforcement agents as
a means of deciding who should be investigated, except where these characteristics
are part of a specific suspect description." Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra
note 17, at 11 (emphasis added). Note that the Civil Rights and Education Fund
also observed that profiling includes "law enforcement activity that relies in part,
as well as solely, on race (in the absence of a specific suspect description). . .." Such
a definition of racial profiling was included in consent decrees between the Depart-
ment of Justice and the State of New Jersey. Id. at 37 n.17 (citing Consent Decree
in United States v. State of New Jersey, Civil No. 99-5970, 2 (MLC) (Dec. 30,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm. "Selec-
tive enforcement based in part on race is no less pernicious or offensive to the
principle of equal justice than is enforcement based solely on race." Civil Rights
and Education Fund Report, supra note 17, at 11. See also supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
110 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 12 (citing studies show-
ing that blacks were stopped in significantly higher numbers than whites, includ-
ing a study that between 1988 and 1991, "[b]lacks were 35 percent of those
stopped" on the New Jersey Turnpike "though only 13.5 percent of the cars on the
Turnpike had a [bilack occupant and [bilacks were only 15 percent of all traffic
violators").
111 Before September 11, President George W. Bush not only condemned racial
profiling, but committed to stopping it in America: Racial profiling "is wrong and
we will end it in America." Mike Allen, Bush Issues Ban On Racial Profiling; Pol-
icy Makes Exceptions For Security, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at A14, available at
2003 WL 56498502. Attorney General John Ashcroft also condemned racial profil-
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out because they belong to a minority group and then subjecting
them to criminal investigation encourages lazy police prac-
tices, 112 humiliates the individuals who are so selected, 113 and
causes resentment in the minority community against the po-
lice. 1 4 Lastly, such "racial profiling," which is bound to produce
a large number of false positives, is an inefficient use of scarce
police resources."15
C. The Fallacy of Racial Profiling
In a country as racially diverse as the United States with
millions of people representing each identifiable ethnic or racial
group, the racial or ethnic background of an individual has vir-
tually no probative value except to exclude that person from the
"circle of suspicion."116 Thus, for example, let us assume that
reliable witnesses told the police that they saw a white male
ing. Eric Ferkehnhoff and Noah Isakson, Ashcroft Calls on Police to End Racial
Profiling, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2001, at 17. The House introduced a bill not only to
ban racial profiling, but also to permit profiling victims to sue the police. See H.R.
2074/S, 107th Cong., (2001). After September 11, neither the House nor the Sen-
ate moved on the bill. See also infra note 137 (discussing, inter alia, the rein-
troduction of the "End the Racial Profiling Act").
112 See Davies, supra note 20, at 63 (noting the unreliability of determining
whom the United States Customs Service decided to strip search using a racial
profile). See also David A. Harris, Let's Look at What Counts: Racial Profiling
Doesn't Stop Common Criminals. It Won't Stop Terrorists, Either, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at 60 ("[U]sing race takes law enforcement eyes off what counts
[suspicious behavior not ethnic background], making them [the police] less
effective").
113 For example, United States District Court Judge Filemon Vela has appar-
ently been frequently stopped around Brownsville, Texas by Boarder Patrol agents
and questioned, because of his Latino appearance. See Civil Rights and Education
Fund, supra note 17, at 16-17 (citing DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 3-6
(2002)).
114 See Davies, supra note 20, at 74.
115 Professor Harris notes that using racial profiling unnecessarily increases
the suspect pool:
All of those in the suspect category [as a result of their racial or ethnic
profile] then have to be stopped, questioned, searched, and investigated,
even when their behavior would not have pointed to any reason to do this.
This spreads our finite investigative resources too thin. It's like looking
for a needle in a haystack, but adding more hay.
Harris, supra note 112, at 60. See also Cole, supra note 16, at 976-77.
116 See Davies, supra note 20, at 65-66; United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79,
85 (8th Cir. 1976) (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("While the factor of race eliminates
from suspicion all persons of another race, it cannot be used to create suspicion of a
particular person of that race" (emphasis added)).
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leave a van (which turned out to be filled with explosives)
outside of the federal building in Oklahoma City. The explo-
sives are subsequently detonated, causing massive loss of life
and property. In investigating this crime, the police could prop-
erly exclude all non-white persons from the "circle of sus-
pects."11 7 That the alleged perpetrator is apparently white and
male hardly justifies questioning every white male in
Oklahoma or in surrounding states. Not only would it require
enormous police resources to do so, the odds of finding the ac-
tual perpetrator by this method would be exceedingly remote.
One might argue that there are fewer members in a minor-
ity group than there are whites in the United States. 18 Mathe-
matical analysis, however, supports the notion that race or
ethnicity alone provide scant basis for suspecting an individual
of terrorist crimes. Most population surveys estimate that
there are 2.8 million to 6 million Arab and Muslims immigrants
living in the United States. 119 In purely mathematical terms,
the odds that race or ethnicity alone will yield suspects is in the
117 For purposes of this hypothetical, assume a lone perpetrator carried out the
bombing. See Davies, supra note 17, at 54-63 (setting forth a series of hypotheti-
cals to explain racial and ethnic profiling and how it violates basic principles of
fundamental fairness).
118 Whites, however, are projected to be an increasingly smaller part of the
overall population of the United States. See Leonel Sanchez, Migration to Fuel
Census Growth; Tripling of Hispanic, Asian Populations in U.S. Expected by 2050,
SAN DIEGO TRiB., Mar. 18, 2004, at A3.
119 See Bill Broadway, Number of U.S. Muslims Depends on Who's Counting,
WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2001, at Al (noting that a study commissioned by four Mus-
lim organizations estimated the number of Muslims living here to be six to seven
million, that a study commissioned by the American Jewish Committee estimated
the number to be from 1.5 to 3.5 million, that 2001 Britannica Book of Year esti-
mated 4.1 million, and that a City University of New York telephone survey esti-
mated 2.8 million). See also Davies, supra note 20, at 52 (estimating 3.5 million).
Another survey using census data from 1990 and 2000 estimated that at that time
there were nearly 2.9 Muslims in the United States, John R. Logan & Glenn De-
anne, The Muslim World in Metropolitan America, (Lewis Mumford Center for
Comparative Urban and Regional Research, University at Albany) Aug. 15, 2003.
Since by law an individual's religious affiliation may not be inquired of by the cen-
sus takers, the exact numbers of Muslims living in the United States is not defini-
tively known. Some estimate the number to be as high as six millions others in
between two million and three million. See Joyce Howard Price, 1.2 Million Arabs
in U.S., Census States, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http://washington-
times.com/national/20031203-113839-9531r.htm (noting that the 2000 census re-
ported 1.2 million Arabs, but that many Arabs do not practice the Muslim faith
and that many Muslims are not Arab).
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order of one in several thousands, odds so remote as to make
race or nationality relatively little help in identifying
terrorists.120
Professor Davies explains these phenomena through the
following hypotheticals. Assume a reliable witness identifies
the perpetrator of a robbery as being a "white male." One could
set forth the following syllogism:
Major Premise: "The person who committed this robbery
was a white male."
Minor Premise: "Defendant is a non-white male."
Conclusion: "Defendant did not commit this robbery."121
The result of this syllogism appears almost self-evident, but
Professor Davies correctly points out that the converse is not
true:
Major Premise: "The person who committed this robbery
was a white male."
Minor Premise: "Defendant is a white male."
Conclusion: "Defendant committed the robbery."1 22
Unless there is only one white male, the syllogism is false. She
notes:
[T]he addition of just one other white male to the cohort would
reduce the chances of Defendant's responsibility for the crime by a
full half. The addition of two white males to the group would
lower the odds to one third, and so on. This should make it clear
how the possession of a characteristic shared by a group very
quickly loses its usefulness as means of including a particular in-
dividual within a circle of suspicion. The significance of group
characteristics, such as race or ethnicity, drops precipitously as
more and more persons are known to share that same characteris-
tic. In a diverse population, which espouses a commitment to the
principle of unfettered freedom of movement, its utility quickly
approaches (even if it never quite reaches) zero.123
The mathematical result appears counter-intuitive, but it dem-
onstrates that racial or ethnic profiling is among the shallowest
bases for suspecting a particular individual of criminal activity
120 See Davies, supra note 20, at 73-74.
121 See id. at 66.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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in a society like ours, with millions representing each ethnic
group. 124
D. Racial Profiling Encourages Sloppy and Inefficient Police
Practices
Relying on racial profiles rather than evidence that a par-
ticular person or persons have engaged in criminal or other ter-
rorist activities stifles sound policing and investigating
practices. By focusing on individuals who fit a racial profile, the
police are inevitably going to come up with a large number of
false positives. 125 This may have the effect of lulling officers
and causing them to overlook those who do not fit the profile.1 26
For example, Richard Reid, the Al Qaeda shoe bomber, is a Brit-
ish citizen, originally from Jamaica, and is not Arab or "Middle-
Eastern looking." 27 Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person
charged with conspiring to carry out the September 11 attacks,
is a French citizen. Jose Padilla, the alleged dirty bomber, is a
Puerto Rican American. 28 None of these individuals would
have been subject to the "Special Registration" program after
having arrived in the United States.
124 See Harris, supra note 112, at 60 ("But the third thing the study [commis-
sioned by the New York Attorney General] revealed was even more important.
When police used race or ethnicity as one factor - not the only factor, but just one
factor among many - to decide who to stop, their "hit rate" [the rate at which
police succeeded in finding dope or guns or in making arrests] was lower than
when they made no use of race."). But see R. Spencer MacDonald, supra note 98, at
133 (quoting Gary T. Marx & Nancy Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of
Secrets: Computers as Informants, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 423 ("[T]here is
nothing illegal or exceptional about being [a middle-eastern] male, purchasing a
one-way airline ticket, paying for it with cash, and obtaining the ticket last minute
at the airport. But analysis suggests that when these factors occur together, the
chances of a skyjacking attempt are increased"); Daniel Pipes, A Call for Intelli-
gent Profiling, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 30, 2003, at 7.
125 Cole, supra note 16, at 976-77; see also Harris, supra note 112, at 60.
126 Apparently some United States governmental officials have recognized this
problem and are fearful that Al Qaeda will use some non-Arab or Muslim appear-
ing individuals to carry out an attack on the United States. Frank Millar, Police
Quiz al-Qaeda Suspects as US Warns of Attacks, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at 13,
available at 2002 WL 4782744.
127 See Cole, supra note 16, at 976.
128 See Human Rights Watch, Arbitrary Detention, in PRESUMPTION OF GUILT:
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (Aug. 2002), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA-08082-05.htm.
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During World War II, the Japanese apparently relied pri-
marily upon Caucasian spies, not those of Japanese ancestry. 129
Al Qaeda is said to have over one billion dollars in assets. 130
With such resources, Al Qaeda could easily hire white Ameri-
cans or non-Arab or non-Muslim nationals to carry out opera-
tions in the United States. Senior law enforcement officials
stated in a memo of October 2002, which "circulated to Ameri-
can law enforcement agents worldwide," that "[flundamentally,
believing that you can achieve safety by looking at characteris-
tics [racial profiling] is silly. If your goal is preventing attacks
: . . you want your eyes and ears looking for pre-attack behav-
iors, not characteristics."1 3 1
Some police officials have argued that members of minority
groups commit certain crimes in greater numbers than other ra-
cial groups, justifying the use of race as grounds for "reasonable
suspicion." 32 Researchers and scholars have questioned this
assumption, particularly in the context of drug offenses. 133
Some scholars argue that racial profiling of minorities has cre-
ated a self-fulfilling prophecy: because more members of minor-
ity groups are investigated, more are found criminally
129 See The Erosion Of Online Privacy Rights in the Recent Tide of Terrorism, 8
COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 131, 139 (2003) (noting that "during the entire course of
the war, ten people were convicted of spying for Japan, all of whom were Cauca-
sian" (citing Debra LaFountaine & Pei P. Wang, Historical Background (1995)
[and] ... Curtis B. Munson, The Munson Report, available in part at http://www.
curriculumunits.com/crucible/whunts/munson report.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2003) (noting in this special report to President Roosevelt that all evidence pointed
to the fact that Japanese Americans were perfectly loyal to the United States)). No
case of espionage has been documented against any Japanese immigrants or Japa-
nese-Americans for activities during World War II. See Pear, supra note 106, at
Al.
130 Zachary Abuza, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Net-
work of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, 25 CONT. SOUTHEAST ASIA 169 Aug. 1,
2003, available at 2003 WL 58378389; Indian Sleuths Probe Diamond Network
Links with Al Qaeda, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, June 23, 2002.
131 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 29 (quoting Bill
Dedman, Words of Caution Airport Security: Memo Warns Against Use of Profiling
as Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2001).
132 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 17. See also R.
Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 571, 578 n.29 (2003) (quoting Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2001, (Magazine)) (quoting a Los Angeles police chief, Bernard
Parks: "It's not the fault of the police when they stop minority males.... It's the
fault of the minority males for committing the crime").
133 See Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 17-19
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responsible for the target offenses.134 Had white persons been
investigated as thoroughly, according to these scholars, more
white persons would be found criminally responsible for the tar-
get offenses. 135
To the extent that some minorities are believed to commit
certain crimes more than other groups, query whether the dif-
ference may be attributable to economic class rather than to
race or ethnic group identification. 136 If one controls for eco-
nomic class, might even the perceived difference in crime rates
among racial groups disappear or become significantly less?
Even assuming arguendo that some racial groups commit more
of a certain offense than others do, statistics demonstrate that
the overwhelming number of members of a given race or ethnic
group are law abiding. Since race or national origin is generally
an improbable indicator of criminality, racial profiling is unjus-
tified even if one accepts for argument sake the above-men-
tioned assumption. 37
134 Developments in the Law- Race and the Criminal Process, Racial Discrimi-
nation on the Beat: Extending the Racial Critique to Police Conduct, 10 HARv. L.
REV. 1494, 1496 (1988) (arguing that targeting African-Americans leads to higher
arrests and convictions for African-Americans which the police then use to justify
continuing to target African-Americans). See also Banks, supra note 132, at 578
n.31 (citing MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 143 (1999); Scott L. Johnson, The
Self-fulfilling Nature of Police Profiles, in THE SYSTEM IN BLACK AND WHITE 93
(Michael W. Markowitz & Delores D. Jones-Brown eds., 2000)).
135 Id.
136 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93
YALE L. J. 214, 238 (1983) (citing McNelly & Pope, Race and Involvement in Com-
mon Law Personal Crime: A Response to Hindelang, 8 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 405,
405-06 (1978)).
137 State and federal courts have been slow to condemn racial profiling by gov-
ernmental officials. Although authority exists for the proposition that police may
not stop an individual based solely on that individual's race, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975), the Supreme Court has specifically up-
held pretextual traffic stops where the officer has used race in whole or in part as
the real reason for the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); cf.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (reinstating district court's
order denying discovery to claimant in a selective prosecution claim and ruling
that "claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy 'had a dis-
criminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose'"). Lower
courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in endorsing racial profiling:
See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1980)
(finding significance in the fact that a "Mexican" male visited defendant's
hotel room); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir. 1976) (re-
jecting the defendant's claim that his skin color is irrelevant because "the
color of a person's skin, be it black or white, is an identifying factor which,
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while insufficient by itself, assists the police in narrowing the scope of
their identification procedure."); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz.
1975) ("[Tlhe fact that a person is obviously out of place in a particular
neighborhood is one of several factors that may be considered by an officer
and the court in determining whether an investigation and detention is
reasonable and therefore lawful."); see also United States v. Richard, 535
F.2d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that, even though an informant
may be using race as the only basis for suspicion, if police couple this with
other factors, a reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop
may be justified); State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Wash. 1992) (not-
ing that race may sometimes be a factor in a stop). Even a fairly recent
case seems to have looked the other way regarding charges of racial profil-
ing. See United States v. Stone, 73 F. Supp. 2d 441, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("Nevertheless, even assuming that the defendant was singled out for
closer inspection on the basis of his race in concert with the time and the
location in which he walked, I am satisfied that the officers' subsequent
actions fully comply with the Fourth Amendment.. ").
Sean P. Trende, Note: Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combat-
ing Racial Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 356 n.151 (2000).
A few courts have begun to provide redress to those who have been vic-
tims of racial profiling. For example, the Ninth Circuit has expressly re-
pudiated the language in Brignoni-Ponce, suggesting that race may be a
factor to be considered in stopping individuals suspected of committing
immigration violations. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 112
(9th Cir. 2000). The court stated that "[tihe likelihood that in an area in
which the majority or even a substantial part- of the population is His-
panic, any given person of Hispanic ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone
an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic appearance a rele-
vant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus." Id. at 1132 (citing
United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir. 1991). Given the
widely reported racial profiling of African-Americans by the New Jersey
State police, the New Jersey courts appear to have applied Armstrong far
more liberally, permitting discovery of police records on stops and profil-
ing only upon a showing of colorable discrimination. See, e.g., State v.
Ballard, 752 A.2d 735, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); see also State
v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). A few other
courts have likewise ruled that racial profiling is unlawful:
See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (reversing a conviction where part of the officers' suspicion
stemmed from the defendant's being a white person in a black neigh-
borhood); Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. Ct.
App. 1990) ("While we agree that the State has a substantial interest
in apprehending drug traffickers, we do not agree with the Common-
wealth's argument that this type of racial classification is necessary
to accomplish that objective. A person's race or national origin does
not indicate a propensity to traffic in drugs."); State v. Barber, 823
P.2d 1068, 1075 (Wash. 1992) ("Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are odious to a free people whose institu-
tions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."); see also United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that language justifying the use of race at border stops in
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Regarding Arab and Muslim immigrants, not to mention
Sikhs and South Asians, there is little data to support the con-
clusion that members of those populations are more likely to
engage in terrorist activities against the United States than
members of other groups. 138 After all, before September 11, the
Brignoni-Ponce was "dictum," that circumstances and subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions had changed to justify abrogation of that "dic-
tum," and abrogating that "dictum"); ... cf. Washington v. Lambert,
98 F.3d 1181 passim (9th Cir. 1996) (condemning repeatedly the in-
dignities suffered by African-Americans at the hands of law enforce-
ment officials); Martinez v. Village of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d
780, 782-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (approving a settlement agreement, while
offering three pages of policy reasons for allowing more racial profil-
ing cases to proceed).
Trende, supra, at 357 n.153.
It is, however, generally not considered racial profiling for the police, after
they have received a specific description of a perpetrator, including the perpetra-
tor's race, to stop individuals of the same race as the perpetrator. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.8471(2) (2003) ("Racial profiling does not include law enforcement's use
of race or ethnicity to determine whether a person matches a specific description of
a particular subject"). Even in such a case, however, the police should not be em-
powered to stop and investigate every member of a minority community sharing
the same racial characteristic as the perpetrator. See Brown v. Oneonta, 253 F.3d
769, 781 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying hearing en banc) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ("Is
the state creating an express racial classification that can only be approved if it
survives strict scrutiny when state officers (like the police) ignore essentially eve-
rything but the racial part of a victim's description, and, acting solely on that ra-
cial element, stop and question all members of that race they can get hold of, even
those who grossly fail to fit the victim's description? The answer to that question,
all but ignored by the panel, seems to me-both on the precedents and on plain
logic-to be a resounding yes").
Aside from the courts, Congress and some state legislatures have taken some
beginning steps to stop racial profiling. A bill has been re-introduced in Congress
that would require that police create a record of the race of all persons who are
stopped along with other relevant criteria to help prevent racial profiling. See
Sens. Corzine, Feingold Introduce New Racial Profiling Bill, ST. NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WL 62442723. The bill would also give victims of
racial profiling a private cause of action. Id. Some states have enacted legislation
aimed at reducing or eliminating racial profiling. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:
30-5(d) (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8471. For a list of states with some form of
anti-racial profiling legislation and a brief description thereof, see David A. Harris,
The Reality of Racial Disparity In Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Col-
lection, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 82 n.57 (2003). In some other states, legisla-
tors are proposing similar measures. See, e.g., Bruce Landis, Proposal Focuses on
Racial Profiling, PROVID. J.-BULL., Feb. 24, 2004, at B-01 (noting that two Rhode
Island legislators are proposing a bill to eliminate racial profiling).
138 "[T]errorism is not a Muslim monopoly." Donald A. Dripps, Terror and Tol-
erance: Criminal Justice for the New Age of Anxiety, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 26
(2003). There are terrorists on both the left and the right, from American Nazis
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author of the most serious terrorist crime on United States soil
was a white, Roman Catholic male who was raised in upstate
New York.139 Perhaps the most telling evidence of the ineffec-
tiveness of racial profiling is the apparent failure of the govern-
ment's policies profiling Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South
Asians to uncover substantial terrorist criminal activity against
the United States.
E. Racial Profiling Offends Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs and
South Asians and Their Communities, Discouraging
Them from Being Willing Allies in the Fight Against
Terrorism
Some have argued that although Arabs and Muslims living
in the United States have been subjected to racial profiling,
such a measure is reasonable given the enormity of September
11 and the ethnic identity of the perpetrators and of the mem-
bership of Al Qaeda. 140 Furthermore, the government has de-
tained some Arabs and Muslims and has scrutinized the
activities of many Arabs and Muslims; but it has not forcibly
detained all Arabs and Muslims regardless of their citizenship
as we did to the Japanese during World War II. Many Ameri-
cans are likely to agree with Kathleen Parker, who stated,
"ib]eing threatened or otherwise harmed because of your ethnic
origin is persecution. Being subjected to a little extra scrutiny
because, as it happens, your ethnic origin is the same as that of
terrorists who just killed more than 6,000 innocent civilians, is
inconvenience."141
The targets of racial profiling, however, appear to have a
different perception. "Even the suggestion that people should
tolerate modest impositions is galling .. . [w]hat looks like a
and some in the so-called Patriot movement, to environmental terrorists, not to
mention lone acting individuals like the Unabomber.
139 For a good discussion of Timothy McVeigh, see Peter G. Chronis, Prejudiced
Profilers Had Sniper Figured All Wrong, DENV. POST, Oct. 29, 2002, at B-07, avail-
able at 2002 WL 6579220.
140 Cf. Eric L. Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Intern-
ment's True Legacy, 1 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 103 (2003) (arguing that racial profiling
may be appropriate in some circumstances and that the major failure of interning
the Japanese during World War II was the enormity of the deprivation, not the
racial profiling itself).
141 Davies, supra note 20, at 46 (quoting Kathleen Parker, All is Fair in War
Except Insensitivity, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 23, 2001, at A15).
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light touch to observers can feel like an awfully heavy hand to
those who feel it."142 There is some evidence that racial profil-
ing might inflict both humiliation and "psychic harm."143 For
example, in June 1993, a black bank executive was pulled over
by Toledo, Ohio police allegedly for not having a front license
plate. He had just attended a conference. Instead of issuing a
ticket, the officer required him to assume a spread eagle posi-
tion while the officer subjected him to a body search. At that
precise moment, a bus of conference participants passed by. He
is reported to have stated, "I never felt so degraded, humiliated
and belittled in all my life."1 44 Likewise, Texas state judge Gil-
berto Hinojosa is often pulled over by immigration authorities
because of his Latino appearance. He stated that "Southern
Texas 'feels like occupied territory . .. [ilt does not feel like
we're in the United States of America."' 1 45
Alternatively, consider Ejaz Haider, an editor of an En-
glish-Language news magazine in Pakistan, who was visiting
the United States as a Fellow of the Brookings Institution, in
Washington, D.C. Complying with immigration regulations
upon arriving here, Mr. Haider registered with the INS who
told him to report for an interview within forty days.146 After
speaking with officials in the State Department and INS, he
was told he did not have to report. INS agents subsequently
arrested him and told him he would be spending a night in
jail.1 47 Through the intercession of the Brookings Institution,
he was released, but others lacking such connections may have
faced harsher treatment. 148
142 Wu, supra note 102, at 57.
143 See, e.g., Banks, supra note 132, at 591 n.112 (citing Paul Brest, The Su-
preme Court, 1975-In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 9-10 (1976)).
144 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 20.
145 Id. at 20 (quoting Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border Patrol Singles Out
Too Many Blameless Hispanics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000).
146 Civil Rights and Education Fund, supra note 17, at 26 (citing George
Lardner, Jr., Brookings Scholar is Detained by INS; Registration Rule Snags
Pakistani Editor, WASH. POST., Feb. 5, 2003). See also Ejaz Haider, Wrong Mes-
sage to the Muslim World, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2003, at A23.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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Racial profiling is humiliating because it amounts to dis-
criminatory treatment based on race. 149 In the anti-terrorism
context, the population as a whole does not share the burden of
heightened security measures. Rather, those who share the
burden are a discrete and insular minority, the foreign born
from a select group of countries and others who look like
them.150 Racial profiling amounts to presuming someone is a
criminal solely because of his or her race or nationality. Even
when race is "but a factor" among other factors considered, it
helps serve as a substitute for real evidence that a person may
be involved in criminal activity.151
What authorities seem to ignore is the effect that such race
based policies have on the innocent individuals and the commu-
nities that the policies inevitably touch. 52 The overwhelming
number of Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians that live or
temporarily reside in the United States are law-abiding. They
149 Justice Brennan noted the effects of racial profiling persons of Mexican
ancestry:
To be singled out for referral and to be detained and interrogated must be
upsetting to any motorist. One wonders what actual experience supports
my Brethren's conclusion that referrals "should not be frightening or of-
fensive because of their public and relatively routine nature." In point of
fact, referrals, viewed in context, are not relatively routine; thousands are
otherwise permitted to pass. But for the arbitrarily selected motorists who
must suffer the delay and humiliation of detention and interrogation, the
experience can obviously be upsetting. And that experience is particu-
larly vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively re-
ferred, knowing that the officers' target is the Mexican alien. That deep
resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair discrimination is not diffi-
cult to foresee.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 572-73 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
150 See Cole, supra note 16, at 960, 981 (quoting John Hart Ely for the proposi-
tion that 'aliens' were an 'easy case' for a 'discrete and insular minority').
151 Note that the bill entitled, "End Racial Profiling Act of 2004" makes any use
of race illegal in deciding whether to stop a motorist absent a specific description of
the perpetrator. See also Harris, supra notes 112, at 60 (noting that police were
less effective in identifying perpetrators even when using racial profiling only "as a
factor" than when the police looked solely at suspect behavior and did not profile at
all).
152 In the domestic context, racial profiling undermines the credibility of the
police and, "[als a result, it is a natural reaction of distrustful law abiding citizens
to think of officers as enemies and fail to cooperate with them in community polic-
ing programs and general investigations." Jenna K. Perrin, Note, Towards Eradi-
cating the Pervasive Problem of Racial Profiling in Minnesota: State v. Fort 660
N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003), 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 63, 99 (2004).
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are or could be our natural allies in the so-called "war against
terrorism." They are in the best position to know if members of
their communities are plotting against us. 153 They could give
us intelligence, leads, tips, and serve as witnesses to any
planned "terrorist activity." Good law enforcement requires de-
veloping close ties to community leaders and the trust of indi-
vidual members of the community.154 Racially profiling Arabs,
Muslims, and others weakens ties to community leaders and
undermines the trust of the community in the fairness and im-
partiality of law enforcement officials.1 55 Instead of enhancing
security, racial profiling thus may be threatening our security,
by weakening the best source of evidence we would probably be
able to obtain, evidence from others in the Arab, Muslim, Sikh,
and South Asian communities. The next section discusses the
international implications of mistreating Arabs and Muslims in
the United States and elsewhere.
V. COMBATING A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LiKE AiL QAEDA
Examining the policies of the United States towards Iraq
and Al Qaeda, one gets the impression that, to paraphrase Ein-
stein's comment about the advent of the nuclear bomb,1 56 Sep-
153 See Dripps, supra note 138, at 27. Professor Dripps notes as follows: "[A]ny
division of suspects along racial, ethnic or religious lines runs the standing risk of
invidious discrimination. Many entirely innocent persons will be targeted simply
because of national origin or religion. This not only compromises an important
principle; it also runs the risk of alienating the very people who are in the best
position to observe suspicious activity among persons of Middle Eastern extraction
or Islamic faith." Id.
'54 Maintaining trust and close ties to the community enhances police
effectiveness:
Establishing and maintaining mutual trust is the central goal of commu-
nity partnership. Trust will give the police greater access to valuable in-
formation that can lead to the prevention of and solution of crimes. It will
also engender support for police activities and provide a basis for a pro-
ductive working relationship with the community that will find solutions
to local problems.
About Community Policing (The Community Policing Consortium), available at
http://www.communitypolicing.orglabout2.html; see also Butterfield, supra note
81, at B7 (quoting the Seattle police's chiefs concern about racial profiling because
of the importance of the police gaining the trust of the community).
155 See preceding note for a statement of some principles underlying effective
policing.
156 "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes
of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophes." JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Albert Einstein).
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tember 11 has changed everything but our thinking. The
Executive Branch has certainly attempted to change our ideas
about fundamental legal principles such as access to legal coun-
sel, confidentiality of communications with counsel, the con-
demnation of indefinite detention, of torture and degrading
treatment, and of so-called preventive wars against countries
that do not immediately threaten us. But such reflexive ideas
and policies seem based on the notion that we live in a vacuum,
that any violations of basic principles of domestic or interna-
tional law that we commit in the name of security are not only
justified, but will necessarily advance our security. The grow-
ing evidence, however, suggests that the Executive's interna-
tional and domestic policies directed against Arabs and
Muslims may actually be counter-productive in the "war on
terror."
In the fight against Al Qaeda, we must consider with whom
we are dealing and the most effective approach for reducing, if
not eliminating, the threat to our cities and suburbs, facilities,
aircraft, communications, and, above all, our people. 157 There
are more than one billion Muslims in the world.158 In the Arab
world, there are more than 200 million people. 159 Few democra-
cies exist in the Islamic world;160 virtually all of the Arab coun-
157 Portions of this article and particularly this section are taken from Thomas
M. McDonnell, The Death Penalty: An Obstacle to the "War on Terrorism"? 37
VAND. J. TRANs. L. 353, 394-400 (2004).
158 Islam, FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at http:/!
www.lexis.com/research/retrieve/frames?_m=6ec0981c4a1412a6af627022a84ab29
5&docnum=8&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=l&wchp=dGLbVlb-lSlWV&_md5=eaa60
4a6d0ff069d9aef5cae87849b5e.
159 Arabs, FUNK AND WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003), available at http:ll
www.lexis.com/research/retrieve/frames?_m=doadadda87b4653fc5a82a58437f828
c&docnum=15&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=ll&wchp=dGLbVlb-lSlWV&_md5=7c7
fd68e8f4dde8235ea80d85e39afec.
160 The leading one is Turkey, which, unfortunately, possesses one of the
worst, if not the worst, human rights records in Europe. See Amnesty Int'l., Tur-
key: Endemic Torture Must End Immediately (Nov. 8, 2001), at http://web.amnesty.
org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR44077200I?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES/TURKEY.
Turkey's parliament has, however, abolished the death penalty in peacetime, a
step that Amnesty International had been urging for decades and which the Euro-
pean Union has required as a condition of Turkey's membership. See Amnesty
Int'l., Turkey: Abolition of the Death Penalty Welcomed (Aug. 2, 2002), at http:ll
web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR440362002?OpenDocument&of=Abolition
COUNTRIES/TURKEY. Whether this also signals that Turkey will end its prac-
tice of torture and other human rights abuses remains to be seen.
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tries are run by dictators or kings, some more despotic than
others. 16 1 The Arab countries rank last in the world in ratings
on freedom of the press and other freedoms. 162 Aside from the
lack of individual rights, the standard of living has declined in
that part of the world for the last thirty years. 163 Nearly 50
percent of the population in the Arab world is under the age of
25,164 with one-third under the age of fifteen.165 In the oil rich
countries-the Gulf States, for example, economic wealth "has
benefited a relatively few, and has not been distributed to
poorer Islamic countries or to their very large migrant commu-
nities."166 The young face little chance of climbing out of devas-
tating and demoralizing poverty and repression. 67
161 See BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM 117-18 (2002); see also Fareed
Zakaria, The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at
22.
162 Zakaria, supra note 161, at 24.
163 Id. at 25. See also LEWIS, supra note 161, at 114-17. Concerning economic
failure, Lewis notes that "Israel's per capita GDP was three and half times that of
Lebanon and Syria, twelve times that of Jordan, and thirteen and a half times that
of Egypt." Id. at 117 (citing Arab Human Development Report 2002; Creating Op-
portunities for Future Generations, sponsored by the Regional Bureau for Arab
States/UNDP, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development). He discussed
the intellectual life of the Arab world again quoting the Arab Human Development
Report, "'The Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one-fifth of the
number that Greece translates. The accumulative total of translated books since
the Caliph Maa'moun's [sic] time [the ninth century] is about 100,000, almost the
average Spain translates in one year.'" Id. at 115-16. Even in Saudi Arabia, per
capita income plummeted from $28,600 in 1981 to $6,800 in 2001. Eric Rouleau,
Trouble in the Kingdom, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 75, 85.
164 Zakaria, supra note 161, at 22, 32.
165 Id. "Today, two in five Saudis are under 15 years old. [Saudi Arabia's] popu-
lation has exploded while its economy has stagnated with the result that its per
capita income has dropped." Michael Scott Doran, Palestine, Iraq, and American
Strategy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 19, 28. See also Editorial, The Anger of
Arab Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A22.
166 Max Taylor & John Horgan, The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of
Islamic Fundamentalism, 13 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 37, 41 (2001). These
commentators add that "to many devout Muslims the effects of increased oil
wealth have been to increase the influence of the West and challenge the social
basis of Islam, rather than to complement and enhance it." Id.
167 "Even if many terrorists are not directly driven by poverty, the inequities
of globalization feed a general anti-Westernism that is a seedbed for Islamism."
Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18, 28. But
see ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 25 (2002) (noting that "the vast
majority of groups with equivalent or more compelling causes-and with far
greater poverty and disadvantage-have never resorted to terrorism."); FAREED
ZAKARIA, THE FuTuRE OF FREEDOM ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD
138 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he problem is wealth not poverty" and that the
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"Throughout the region [the Middle East,] the [Arab] people
have become ever more disillusioned with the deeply-en-
trenched dictatorships in the their own countries, with the col-
lapse of democratic institutions, hollow nationalistic rhetoric,
and with their failing economies."'16
8
Given the failure of economic and political institutions in
the Arab world, it is not surprising that religion has emerged as
a major force. 169 In the Muslim culture, religion and politics are
intertwined in a way reminiscent of Western Europe before the
Reformation. 170 The fight against terrorism thus needs to em-
brace the social and political reality of the Arab world and the
nature of the organization we are fighting.
The available evidence suggests that Al Qaeda is a network
rather than a single, unified military organization. 17 As one
commentator has written, "[h]aving suffered the destruction of
unearned income from oil revenues, or, for example in the case of Egypt from the
Suez Canal and United States, "relieves the government of the need to tax its peo-
ple-and in return provide something to them, in the form of accountability, trans-
parency, and even representation").
168 See Abbas Amant, Empowered through Violence, The Re-inventing of Is-
lamic Extremism, in THE AGE OF TERROR 29 (Strobe Talbot & Nayan Chanda eds.
2001). See also LEwIS, supra note 161, at 117-19. Given the failure of the economic
and political institutions in Islamic countries, their people are outraged: "The re-
sulting anger is naturally directed first against their rulers, and then against
those whom they see as keeping those rulers in power for selfish reasons." Id. at
119.
169 Noted religious scholar, Karen Armstrong, has observed that the resound-
ing defeat of the Arab States by Israel in the 1967 war led to a religious revival in
the Arab States: "After the humiliating defeat of the Arab Armies during the 1967
Six Day War against Israel, there was a swing toward religion throughout the
Middle East." KAREN ARMSTRONG, IsLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 171 (2000).
170 Id. at 169-73. See also LEWIS, supra note 161, at 6-8 (noting that [d]uring
Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims became at once a political and a religious com-
munity with the Prophet as head of state" and contending that Islam remains
deeply involved with politics and state power); Taylor & Horgan, supra note 166,
at 42 (noting that one of the central positions of Islamic fundamentalism is "the
general equation of the state with the implementation of Islam").
171 See Diaa Rashwan, Impossible to Fight, AL-A.HRAM WKLY., Aug. 8-14, 2002,
available at http://www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/598/opl1.htm (last visited June
20, 2003) (observing that Americans had now accepted the European view that "Al
Qa'eda is actually nothing more than a network and that the violent Islamacist
groups have no unified command, but communicate and cooperate when it suits
their different purposes."). Al Qaeda was created in the 1980s from three terrorist
organizations: "bin Laden's circle of 'Afghan' Arabs, together with two factions
from Egypt, the Islamic Group and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the latter led by Dr.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's top theoretician." See Paul Berman, The Philoso-
pher of Islamic Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
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its sanctuary in Afghanistan two years ago, Al Qaeda's decen-
tralized organization has become more decentralized still."172
Another commentator has analogized Al Qaeda to "a holding
company run by a council (shura) including representatives of
terrorist movements."173 It has also been described as the ter-
rorist equivalent of the Ford Foundation, providing money and
other resources for individual terrorists or movements that pro-
pose terrorist projects.1 74
The nature of the organization suggests the means of com-
bating it. Tactically, the United States and its allies must bring
to justice those responsible for carrying out the outrages of Sep-
tember 11 and defeat those who continue to attempt to terrorize
the United States. 75 Strategically, the United States and its
Coalition partners must take steps to end support in the Arab
and greater Muslim world for Al Qaeda and others who would
resort to terrorism. 76 The decentralized nature of Al Qaeda
172 Jessica Stern, The Protean Enemy, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2003, at 27,
available at 2003 WL 57276699. Stern adds that Al Qaeda apparently has put into
practice so-called "'leaderless resistance,"' a tactic popularized by Louis Beam of
the Aryan Nations, an American Neo-Nazi group. With the advent of the Internet,
leaders do not necessarily have to secretly issue orders or to "pay operatives,"
rather, "they inspire small cells or individuals to take action on their own initia-
tive." Id. See also Eric Bonabeau, Scale Free Networks, SCIENCE, May 2003, ab-
stract available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?colID=l&articleID=000312
F5-B86B-1E90-8EA5809EC5880000.
173 See Pierre Conesa, Background to Washington's War on Teror, Al Qaida,
The Sect, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 2002, available at http://mondediplo.com/
2002/01/07sect?var s+zacarias+moussaoui.
174 Scott Peterson, Islamacists Escalate Fight in N. Iraq, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 22, 2002, at 1 (quoting James Lindsay of the Brookings Institu-
tion). See also JASON BURKE, AL QAEDA, CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR 208 (2003)
(noting that the "Al Qaeda hardcore" rejected volunteers who requested a martyr-
dom operation unless they "came up with their own ideas for attacks"). Al Qaeda
can also be analogized to joint venture capitalists: ("individuals would approach
the chief executive and the board (bin Laden, Atef, et al.) with ideas they believed
were worthy of support"); or a publishing house: ("[flreelancers would approach
them with ideas that would sometimes be finded and resourced but often re-
jected"). Id.
175 See Nicholas Lemann, Letter from Washington, What Terrorists Want; Is
There a Better Way to Defeat Al Qaeda?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2001, at 36.
176 See Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1497-1500 (2003) (criticizing the Bush Administration's largely unilateralist ap-
proach to combating terrorism and the Administration's violating international
law in the process); Thomas Carothers, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror,
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 84, 97 (criticizing the Bush Administration's cur-
rent strategy in handling the war on terror as not paying enough attention to even
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underlies the importance of the United States' gaining the coop-
eration and good will not only of governments, but also of their
law enforcement personnel and of individual citizens in Arab
and other Muslim States and communities throughout the
world. 177 In other words, to root out those responsible for the
handedly promoting democracy around the world); Michael Hirsh, supra note 167,
at 17 notes:
But at the same time, the nature of the terrorist threat demonstrated the
necessity of bolstering the international community, which is built on
nonproliferation agreements, intelligence cooperation, and legitimizing
institutions such as the UN, as well as a broad consensus on democracy,
free markets, and human rights. It also demonstrates the necessity of a
values-driven foreign policy - and of nation building under multilateral
auspices in places such as Afghanistan.
Id. at 18. See also Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Into the Fire: How to
Avoid Getting Burned by the Same Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern
Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1657, 1750-51 (2003) (noting that the United States is
resorting to draconian emergency measures similar to those employed by Great
Britain in Northern Ireland against the IRA, measures which both failed to en-
hance security or to defeat the IRA. The authors advocate "[d]ialogue, cooperation
and attention to civil liberties were the necessary and effective elements in the
strategy to eliminate terrorism"). Cf. Philip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Ter-
rorist Power, 9/11: USA AND UK, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193, 1228 (2003) (quot-
ing Christopher Hewitt's extensive study of British counter-terrorism measures,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI- TERRORIST POLICIES 94 (1984) ("heavy handed repres-
sion is counter productive")); Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror,
FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 127, 130 (concluding that "[sitate building
trumps terror[,]" requires the cooperation of many states, and cannot be done "on
the cheap").
As one commentator has observed concerning how the then impending war in
Iraq was being viewed by American Muslims and others:
If 1 percent of that one billion [the world population of Muslims] felt that
they had sympathy for extremist views, then we are dealing with 10 mil-
lion people. And if 10 percent of those 10 million were a little more active
in pursuing those extreme beliefs and views, then we are dealing with a
potential pool of one million people from which extremist groups and ter-
rorists can recruit.
Michele Norris & Melissa Block, All Things Considered, How a potential war with
Iraq is being viewed by American Muslims and Others (Nat'l Public Radio Broad-
cast, Mar. 14, 2003) available in Lexis, National Public Radio newsfile (quoting
Hussein Hakani of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
177 See Tom Ridge, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, [Ad-
dress] on Fighting Global Terrorism: Security and Cooperation in the 21st Century
before Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Mar. 4, 2004, availa-
ble at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3318. Secretary Ridge stated
as follows:
So to fight back [against terrorists], we too must exploit our assets. We
must investigate and prosecute and confiscate. We must utilize diplo-
macy, intelligence, law enforcement and asset seizure - a multilateral
approach to a multinational problem. We must enlist stronger collabora-
41
PACE INT'L L. REV.
attacks and who pose a continuing threat, we need a firm but
measured response simultaneously demonstrating that we are
not attacking or applying a double standard to Muslims or
Arabs.178
A classic terrorist tactic is to provoke an overreaction:
One [terrorist] recruiting tactic is to stage spectacular acts of ag-
gression that make the insurgency appear to be powerful and ex-
citing. What the [terrorist] entrepreneur wants to have happen
next is a big indiscriminate counterattack, which, in effect, means
that his enemy has been put to work as his chief recruiter. 179
Unfortunately, the invasion of Iraq, a Muslim country (al-
beit with a secular and repressive regime) is likely to be per-
tion and cooperation, and improved information-sharing, both within na-
tions and between them. We must use every available tool to repel these
shadow soldiers.
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. THE COMMUNITY POLICING CONSORTIUM, supra note 154
(discussing the need for the police to gain cooperation of the community to police
effectively on the local level); Butterfield, supra note 81, at B7 (same). But see
Anthony Cordesman, How Should the United States Respond to Terrorism (Cato
Institute Policy Forum) Nov. 27, 2000, at 16, at www.artitranscripts.com (last vis-
ited June 3, 2003) (arguing that "law enforcement partnerships are extremely po-
litical, extremely limited, often inherently corrupt..."). See also BRUCE HOFFMAN,
INSIDE TERRORISM 94-95 (1998):
Whereas secular terrorists attempt to appeal to a constituency variously
composed of actual and potential sympathizers, members of the communi-
ties they purport 'to defend' or the aggrieved people for whom they claim
to speak, religious terrorists are at once activists and constituents en-
gaged in what they regard as a total war. They seek to appeal to no other
constituency than themselves. Thus the restraints on violence that are
imposed on secular terrorists by the desire to appeal to a tacitly support-
ive or uncommitted constituency are not relevant to the religious
terrorist.
Id. at 94-95.
178 Cf LEWIS, supra note 161, at 103-12 (noting that many in the Islamic world
have criticized the West and particularly the United States for applying a double
standard to Muslims and Muslim states). See also Koh, supra note 176, at 1509
(noting that United States joined with the European Union in demanding that
Turkey not execute notorious Kurdish Terrorist Abdullah Ocalan); Richard Falk, A
Roadmap for War, A Flawed Debate, Sept. 27, 2002, available at http://www.trans-
national.org/forum/meet/2002/Falk_ WarFlawedDebate.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2003); CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR 181 ("This presents us with another
enduring truth about the tactics of terror [should a State be tempted to resort to
them in response to terrorism]; they must never be viewed as an expedient or a
controllable instrument of policy, one which, after its purpose is served, will simply
burn itself out").
179 Lemann, supra note 175, at 36 (citing Dr. James Fearon).
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ceived as "a big indiscriminate counterattack" in the Arab and
Muslim worlds.18 0 Likewise, mistreating Arabs and Muslims
both in the United States and abroad is likely to strengthen the
extremist elements in Muslim communities here and over-
seas.181 Moderate, more democratic leading elements in those
societies have difficulty defending against the argument that
the United States is anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.18 2 Conse-
quently, we should adopt, not only with use of our military but
also with our policies at home, an approach that is most likely
180 See Iraq War Helped Al Qaeda, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 2003, at Al (quot-
ing Paul Wilkinson, head of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence at St. Andrew's University in Scotland) ("The political masters in U.S.
and Europe underestimated the extent to which bin Laden would use the war in
Iraq as a propaganda weapon to rejuvenate the movement and attract more
funds."); Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at Al (quoting a Bush Administration panel, "'Hos-
tility toward America has reached shocking levels"' as a result of the Iraq war and
increased tension in the Middle East). Many had predicted this outcome. See, e.g.,
Don Van Natta Jr. & Desmond Butler, Anger on Iraq Seen as New Qaeda Recruit-
ing Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at Al (noting that officials in the United
States, Europe, and Africa observed that the then imminent invasion of Iraq
caused a sharp increase in efforts "to identify and groom a new generation of ter-
rorist operatives" and the officials worry that the invasion of Iraq "is almost cer-
tain to produce a groundswell of recruitment for groups committed to attacks in
the United States, Europe and Israel"); Carothers, supra note 176 ( "A U.S. inva-
sion of Iraq would likely trigger a surge in the already prevalent anti-Americanism
in the Middle East, strengthening the hand of hard-line Islamist groups and pro-
voking many Arab government to tighten their grip, rather than experiment more
boldly with political liberalization"). But see Fouad Ajami, Iraq and the Arabs' Fu-
ture, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 2 (arguing that the United States need not
apologize for its unilateralism and that the focus of the invasion "should be mod-
ernizing the Arab world"). The prison abuse scandal in Iraq has shocked the Arab
and Muslim worlds and is yet another example of their perception of United States
having an anti-Arab and Muslim animus. See Cam Simpson, Arabs cool to Powell
at Forum; Diplomat's Speech Touches on Scandal, CHIC. TRIB., May 16, 2004, at
C3; see also Wayne Washington, Bush Reaches Out to Quell Arab Rage at Inmate
Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 2004, at Al.
181 See Chishti & Meissner, supra note 7, at 1196 ("By targeting Muslim and
Arab immigrants, the U.S. government has deepened the perception abroad that
the U.S. is anti-Muslim and that its democratic values and principles are hypocrit-
ical ... undermining U.S. relationships with exactly the moderate, pro-Western
nations and social groups that we need to fight against terrorism").
182 Id. at 1200 ("Immigration policy should not rely on enforcement programs
that give propaganda advantages to terrorist foes and contribute to their ability to
influence and recruit alienated younger generations").
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to gain the cooperation of our allies and of the moderates within
the Muslim world and that will most likely isolate Al Qaeda.' 8 3
This article does not discuss economic and political mea-
sures necessary to enhance human, civil and economic rights in
the Arab and Islamic worlds.'8 4 To achieve our strategic objec-
tive requires we give both the fact and appearance of treating
any accused Muslim fairly. For example, after Britain estab-
lished internment without trial in Northern Ireland in 1971 to
combat the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), a policy that was
largely directed only at the Northern Irish Catholic community,
support for the IRA increased: "The use of internment effec-
tively alienated a sizeable minority of the population of North-
ern Ireland and made impossible any cooperation with
authorities." 8 5
That experience is particularly relevant for the fight
against Al Qaeda. As previously discussed, one would expect
that members of the Arab and Muslim communities in the
United States would know most about the activities of other
Muslims and Arabs here. Instead of attacking these communi-
183 "[This approach would require] obtaining as much specific local information
as possible and then, perhaps through the use of native 'subcontractors,' convinc-
ing people that linking their future to bin Laden would be a bad idea. It would
have to be a slow, careful, patient process that combined punishments of specific
violent people with the offer of rewards for potential allies of the West. None of
this would alter the strategy of attempting to disrupt bin Laden's access to money
and electronic communications and forestall further attacks. But, for the present,
quiet is America's friend, killing, of Americans by bin Laden, and of Arab civilians
by Americans, is bin Laden's friend, because it draws ordinary people as well as
combat troops to his side." Lemann, supra note 175, at 36 (emphasis added).
When dealing with private terror organizations operating clandestinely in sev-
eral countries, getting help from the authorities and populus of many countries in
essential. Note the recent arrest of five people in Spain believed to be involved in
money laundering for Al Qaeda. "Spanish investigators had worked in close coop-
eration with authorities in Germany and in France ... [and were] also aided by
authorities in the U.S., Tunisia, Switzerland and Portugal." Sebastian Rotella,
THE WORLD 5 Suspects Helped Fund Al Qaeda, Spain Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2003, at A3.
184 Peter G. Peterson, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 74, 75.
185 O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 176, at 1657, 1680. See also British Ac-
tions [in Northern Ireland], Frontline (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 21, 1997)
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/brits.html
(quoting the Northern Ireland Chief of Police who described the internment policy
as "a disaster").
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ties, law enforcement should embrace them.18 6 In that way, we
are more likely to be able to identify and apprehend those likely
to be plotting against us.18 7 This scattershot method of racial
and ethnic profiling is likely to discourage community members
from coming forward with the information we need to stop this
threat 88
VI. CONCLUSION
Although understandable given the authors of September
11 and the awesome magnitude of the attacks, the government's
policy of racial profiling Arabs and Muslims is likely to contrib-
ute to anti-American attitudes both here and abroad, to discour-
age Arabs and Muslims from cooperating with the United
States police and military officials, and to weaken moderate ele-
ments of Arab and Muslim societies while strengthening the ex-
tremist elements both domestically and internationally.
Additionally, racial profiling is morally wrong. During the
Iran hostage crisis, I represented two Iranian students. Then
as now, Iranians (like Iraqis) were required to report to and reg-
ister with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. After
walking into the federal building in Los Angeles with my two
clients, I saw in the drab corridors of INS a sea of Iranian faces.
It was chilling. We are more true to ourselves and can better
protect our society by adopting more measured investigative ap-
proaches and by doing the hard but time tested methods of in-
vestigation, with the aid of the Muslim and Arab communities
and in cooperation with our allies throughout the world.
186 For example, law enforcement officials could establish a program like that
of Dearborn, Michigan, which guaranteed that "no immigration consequences
would flow from [immigrants] coming forward to be interviewed." Chishti &
Meissner, supra note 7, at 1198.
187 Peter M. German, Money Laundering and Corporate Governance from a
Canadian Perspective, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 107, 109 (2003) ("Simply put, a collabora-
tive approach is the only way to detect, deter, and destabilize global criminal enti-
ties"). For a discussion of collaboration and cooperation on the community level,
see supra note 154. For a discussion of such collaboration on the international
level, see supra note 177.
188 As one commentator has noted the importance of grass roots efforts against
terrorist organizations, "The more useful anti-insurgency [and anti-terrorist ] tac-
tic is to compete, literally door to door, for people's loyalty with the coinage of loy-
alty being willingness to inform on one side or the other)." Lemann, supra note
175, at 36.
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